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Theories of practical reasoning and rationality have been expounded at least as far back 
as the Greeks.  Beginning with several historical pers ectives, I attempt to answer the 
descriptive and normative questions of practical resoning and rationality.  I then turn to 
a popular modern attempt, expected utility theory.  I conclude that this approach cannot 
be sustained because of inherent inconsistencies and its i ability to generate advice for a 
class of problems that other decision procedures can handle.  I conclude by offering 
support for a new model of practical reasoning, the practical argument model.  I explain 
the three dimensions of normative assessment for this model: logical, inferential and 
epistemic.  I then show how an expected utility decision-procedure is encompassed by the 
practical argument model and, therefore, subject to these three levels of assessment.  I 
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1.  Introduction 
 Describing how we make deliberate decisions is a project that has a long history, 
deep applications and a wide academic scope.  On the other hand, articulating what 
constitutes a good decision has been somewhat more distinctly the office of philosophy.  
It is no small thing that both the descriptive and normative problems have pervaded 
philosophy from the Greeks onward.  It seems that humans have long held an interest in 
figuring out how we can be both effective and efficient in the world.    
  My purpose, presently, is to explore these issues in the form of practical 
reasoning and rationality.  In addition to helping to clarify what practical reasoning is, I 
hope to show what practical reasoning ought to be.  B ing clear on both counts has the 
potential for several advantageous implications.  Most notably, it may aid in the effective 
self-evaluation of the way each of us uses practical reasoning, helping us to become 
better decision makers.  Moreover, whether or not there is a personal, practical 
advantage, there is certainly an intellectual one.  The theories that I explore in the 
following chapters have served as a launching point f r empirical investigations in 
psychology, economics and the cognitive sciences.  A new model of practical reasoning 
with greater explanatory power and validity, while articulated in philosophy, can have 
theoretical implications across a range of disciplines.  
 It is with these purposes that I put forward my argument.  At the outset, however, 
I must offer one point of distinction.  Though they are sometimes used interchangeably, I 
take practical reasoning and practical rationality to be conceptually distinct.  When I refer 
to practical reasoning, I am referring to a process by which we deliberate about decisions.  
On the other hand, by rationality I refer to a st ndard of behaviour.  Hence, I could 
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employ practical reasoning without being practically rational.  Explaining exactly what 
practical reasoning and practical rationality are is, in part, part of the current project.  I 
have organized the discussion as follows:  I begin with several influential historical 
perspectives on the nature of practical reasoning and r tionality.  These theories are 
important for two reasons.  First, each theory constitutes an attempt to address both the 
descriptive and normative problems that I mentioned above.  These attempts have each 
proved vital to the theoretical evolution of the models of practical reasoning and 
rationality that still invoke discussion today.  Byaddressing the historical perspective, I 
sketch a backdrop against which the modern approaches an be compared and 
understood.  The second reason to articulate these influ ntial approaches is that there are 
a number of commonalities that emerge among them; in the model that I advance (in 
Chapter 5), I encompass this common ground.  Any new model ought to refer to what 
people mean when they talk about “practical reasoning” and “practical rationality”.  It is 
for this reason that enunciating and embracing the shared features of theories of practical 
reasoning and rationality is an important part of the present project. 
 In the following chapter I articulate a theory that s become among the most 
pervasive in debates on practical rationality: expected utility theory.  The model emerged 
from the groundwork laid by one of the historical accounts (David Hume’s instrumental 
reasoning) and now reaches in scope throughout the social sciences.  Expected utility 
theory cannot be ignored in any serious discussion of the modern debates on practical 
rationality.  I briefly trace the development of the model including its ties to probability 
theory and Bayesianism. 
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In the fourth chapter I identify some of these challenges to expected utility axioms 
as well as to the theory’s explanatory power.  I argue that the various objections raise 
valid concerns in terms of the model’s consistency and applicability.  Specifically, as a 
normative standard the model conflicts with other dcision procedures, leaving us in want 
of a way to determine if one or the other procedure is better.  Further, I identify a scenario 
that expected utility is uniquely unable to handle.  I argue that because this decision 
problem is not outside of practical reasoning, it raises concerns regarding expected 
utility’s explanatory and normative range.  
 I argue that these challenges warrant the considerat on of an alternative model of 
practical reasoning and rationality.  I advance the practical argument model for a number 
of reasons.  First, it encompasses several common elements of theories of practical 
reasoning.  As I mentioned previously, these commonalities help to clarify what people 
mean when they say, “practical reasoning” and hence, have a descriptive force. Also, 
there have been various criticisms levied against each of the theories that I highlight in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  I argue that the practical argument odel can serve to adjudicate 
between competing decision strategies and thus, serve to navigate these criticisms.  The 
practical argument model provides clear, non-circular, normative criteria that can both 
serve to evaluate an individual’s practical reasoning and advise towards a particular 
decision procedure given the available information and the agent’s computational 
resources.  
 To arrive at the practical argument model, however, I fi st identify some of the 
conceptions of practical reasoning and rationality that have proven to have influence 
throughout history.  It is these theories to which I turn next. 
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 2. Historical Perspectives 
In this chapter, I offer three historically influential accounts of practical 
reasoning: that of the Ancient Greeks, Hume and Kant.  These perspectives are vital to 
grasp if we are to understand the differences in modern attempts to understand practical 
reasoning.  The differences between them still delineate orientations toward practical 
reasoning to which by contemporary theorists subscri e.  I begin this brief survey with 
the Ancient Greeks.    
The Ancient Greeks and Practical Reasoning  
In this section, I will begin with an interpretation f the Homeric notion of reason 
and then explore, Socrates, Plato, the Stoics and Aristotle in turn.  It is important to note 
that ‘reason’ was anything but a clear and conventional notion among the Greeks, let 
alone one that included an acute distinction between th oretical and practical dimensions.  
Thus, in order to capture Ancient Greek conceptions of practical reasoning, their 
respective aspects of theoretical reason must be acknowledged as well. 
  One of the foremost problems in deciphering Greek conceptions of reason is that 
of translation.  Consider the following passage of H mer’s Iliad:  
Your heart is tireless, like a wood-chopping axe  
wielded by a craftsman cutting timber for a ship. 
The axe makes his force stronger.  Your mind is like that— 
the spirit in your chest is fearless.  (Il 3.63). 
  Note that the translator used the term “spirit” for the Greek word nous, which is 
commonly translated as intellect.  Subsequent commentators have acknowledged the 
difficulty in making a straightforward translation f Homer.  Is he using a literary device 
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here, or is his notion of intellect actually equated with courage?  The point is that it is a 
mistake to assume that we can capture or comprehend t  Greek meaning of a term, like 
‘reason’ or ‘intellect’, by applying our modern conceptions.  In fact, Michael Frede offers 
an account of Homeric reason that is certainly different from the modern conception:   
But though nous is the word which later philosophers like Aristotle will 
use to refer to the intellect or even, more generally, to reason, it is clear 
that in Homer the word refers to a rather specific ability, namely the 
ability to, for instance, quickly get an overview and an understanding of 
a situation.  Homer does refer to a number of, in a large sense, cognitive 
abilities, but there is no notion of an integrated system of abilities which 
roughly plays the role of reason in explaining how we come to have 
beliefs about things and how these come to guide, or fail to guide, our 
actions” (Frede, 1996, p. 4). 
The fact that we see instances of Homer’s characters making inferences and 
judgments in a way that might warrant the ascription of the modern conception of reason 
does not show that he had a grasp of a construct that matches any modern one.   
 However, part of the difficulty in interpreting Homer (and indeed, the Ancients 
generally) is that he did not treat concepts with the same philosophical rigour that has 
become standard.  I now turn to four famous Greek positions on the nature of reason and 
practical reason and argue for certain commonalities that I believe emerge from these 
Greek views.  
 To begin, consider Socrates as he was presented by Plato in Protagoras.   
‘Then it must follow that no one willingly goes to meet evil or what he 
thinks to be evil.  To make for what one believes to be evil, instead of 
making for the good, is not, it seems, in human nature; and when faced 
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with the choice of two evils no one will choose the greater when he 
might choose the less…   
‘Now you recognize the emotion of fear or terror… Whether you call it 
fear or terror, I define it as expectation of evil’ (Protagoras 358d) 
 At the end of this passage, Socrates weds emotion (and desire) to belief in such a 
way that for him, emotion is reduced to specific sort  f beliefs (e.g. fear is the belief that 
evil / pain will ensue).  He makes another point here that we cannot act willingly against 
our beliefs.  This point, if we accept it, avoids a long-standing problem in philosophy: 
akrasia or weakness of the will.  Roughly, the problem is concerned with how we can act 
against what we know (or believe) to be best.  I will return to this issue later, as it 
pervades theories of practical reasoning.  For Socrates, however, the problem is evaded 
since we cannot act contrary to our beliefs. 
 The Stoics, generally1, seem to line up with Socrates’ position but they s e desire 
as a process of ascribing the predicates ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to the particular features of the 
universe while the universe itself is value-neutral.  The ascription process requires 
making a judgment about which predicate is appropriate for a given phenomenon.  This 
would seem to be an instance of theoretical reasoning.  In fact, Aristotle contended that 
practical syllogisms consisted of judgments because they allow for predication:  The 
inference, “All humans are mortal; therefore, Socrates is human” allows us to predicate 
Socrates with ‘is human’.   
 Right action, for the Stoics, begins with right thought, requiring a correct 
judgment about the universe and one’s place in it.  This means that we ought to refrain 
from ascribing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to the features of life and instead be interested in 
                                                
1 Posidonius and Galen are exceptions as they were sc ptical about the very existence of ‘reason’.  
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ascribing ‘true’ and false’ or at least recognizing falsity when we cannot be fully certain 
of truth.    
   Plato did not subscribe to the conjoining of belief and emotion.  Rather, his theory 
divided the soul into parts that can each have independent desires.  In this way, he seems 
to avoid the problem of akrasia.  Consider this passage from the R public, where it 
appears that he is aware of the problem: 
‘Now, can we say that men are sometimes unwilling to drink even 
though they are thirsty?’ 
‘Oh yes; that is often true of many people,’ he said. 
‘Then how are we to describe such cases?’ I asked. ‘Must we not say 
that there is one element in their minds which bids them drink, and a 
second which prevents them and masters the first?’ 
‘So it seems.’ 
‘And isn’t the element of prevention, when present, due to our reason, 
while the urges and impulses are due to our feelings and unhealthy 
cravings?’ (Republic 4, 439c-d) 
 His recognition of conflicting desires is presented in his theory of the tripartite 
soul.  The rational part is governed by reason and desires wisdom and virtue.  The 
irrational part of the soul desires carnal pleasure like food, sex, and bodily comfort.  
Finally, the spirited part of the soul desires to overcome adversity and experience victory.  
When the rational part of the soul is able to take primacy over the other parts, and 
individual may come to know ‘the good’, which means that he will know both what is 
best for him and what is best for the society in which he lives.  This means that coming to 
know what to do in a given situation requires that an individual has grasped a bigger 
picture: he knows himself and what he is good at, and he knows the benefit that he can 
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have to his society.  The desires of the irrational and spirited part of the soul do not 
necessarily need to be ignored, but they must be suordinate to the understanding of the 
rational part of the soul.  This understanding is reached by pursuit the pursuit of reason 
and wisdom. 
 Plato is able to account for akratic action as the result of a soul that is governed 
by its irrational part.  While reason may direct an individual in one direction, his passions 
may have a more forceful pull.  When this is so, then the individual may act against his 
reason.   
 Aristotle retained the idea that there are different types of desire: boulesis is 
characterized as a desire of reason, for it is the desire for something good.  In Rhetoric, 
Aristotle writes:  
All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are 
due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational 
craving [boulesis] is a craving for good, i.e. a wish -- nobody wishes 
for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational craving is twofold, 
viz. anger and appetite. Thus every action must be due to one or 
other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, 
anger, or appetite. (Rhetoric 1369a). 
 Aristotle’s position is that all self-caused action is due to either habit or desire.  
Within desire, he allows for a value-based distinction such that all desires that are good 
are boulesis desires.  This category of desire is linked with reason because it requires an 
understanding of what is ‘good’.  Aristotle, like Plato, allows for non-rational desires: 
thymos, which desires love and friendship and epithymia, which desires pleasure.  For 
him, a desire can be classified as both thymos or epithymia and boulesis.  An example is a 
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desire to be with a friend who satisfies both a need for companionship and can convey an 
accurate understanding of what is good for the indiv dual.   
 There is a commonality that has emerged from Socrates through Aristotle: each 
theoretical perspective links, in some way, reason with desire.  Michael Frede (1996) 
makes the point that each of these schools conceives reason as having the desire for truth 
itself. Reason for these thinkers then, has a motivational pull and is not merely ascribed 
an instrumental status.  A second common feature of ason for these Greek schools is 
that knowledge (or at least beliefs or assumptions) exist as constitutive parts of reason.   
 Most directly, Plato’s theory of the Forms holds that our eternal souls have full 
knowledge before they are united to our bodies.  It is, in part, the job of reason to get us 
back to the understanding that we had in our pre-embodied existence.  Socrates also took 
the position that we have inherent knowledge, which can be discovered by appealing to 
our reason.  The Socratic method would seem to rely on this assumption since it guides 
people into knowledge without giving them any information that they did not already 
know. 
 Aristotle and the Stoics differ on the matter, as they subscribe to the tabula rasa 
viewpoint.    However, as Frede puts it, “… they assume that it is constitutive of reason to 
have a fundamental knowledge of things, they argue that reason only emerges in the 
course of our development precisely to the degree that we acquire this grasp on, and 
knowledge of, things which make thinking and reasoning, properly speaking, possible in 
the first place” (1996, p. 11).  For Aristotle, reason only comes about as we begin to 
grasp universal concepts and principles.  For the Soics, an individual’s intellectual 
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development involves the soul being converted into reason itself, by discarding its natal 
irrationality and understanding the neutrality of the universe. 
 A third commonality among these schools is their commitment to the practical 
nature of reason.  Specifically, it is being guided by reason that allows us to live well.  In 
acquiring theoretical knowledge (or at least shedding false beliefs) about ourselves, our 
society and the nature of the universe, we have the pot ntial to live well. 
 For Socrates, this means that we need to rid ourselves of false beliefs and 
recognize our epistemic limits.  While for the Stoics we are to understand the universe, 
which will facilitate our separation from the irrational experiences of pain and pleasure.  
Plato tells us that we must be led by the reason-governed rational part of our souls, which 
will allow us to understand and adhere to the role that we ought to play in society.   
 Aristotle distinguished between practical and theoretical reason, but 
acknowledged that both are necessary for a person to live well.  Through theoretical 
understanding, we can come to know universal concepts and principles, which in part 
will give us cognitive tools to interact with our environment.  However, the primary focus 
of theoretical knowledge is its aim at truth.  For instance, as he describes in Categories, 
we can gain knowledge through judgment by drawing intellectual associations that 
correspond with reality.  He sets out logical principles that serve to underpin these 
judgments.2  Though his principles are grasped at a theoretical level, they are employed 
in practical experience.        
On the other hand, Aristotle posits another kind of knowledge that is not aimed at 
knowing or understanding the truth, but at understanding what needs to be done, and 
knowing how to do it.  This practical knowledge can inform our theoretical knowledge as 
                                                
2 Perhaps most famously, the law of non-contradiction [ ¬ ( p ¬∧ p )] and the law of identity (p = p ).  
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we experiment and manipulate our environment.  Its aim, however, is that we complete 
our practical goal (whether building a bridge, or eating a meal).  Famously, Aristotle used 
the practical syllogism to formalize practical reasoning.  It takes the form3: 
Universal premise  (e.g. dry food is good for every man).   
Particular premise (I am a man).  
Practical conclusion (therefore, eat dry food).  
 However, it would be a mistake to take this as Aristotle’s only comment on 
practical reasoning.  In Nicomachean Ethics he presents us with an argument for the best 
sort of life.  It is a life spent pursuing eudaimonia, the end of all ends, which requires 
both living a full life (i.e. one of many pursuits) and pursuing theoretical knowledge.  For 
him, this ‘practical’ guide to life allows us to ful ill our potential as human beings.  
Insofar as practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do, Aristotle’s theory of 
eudaimonia encompasses both theoretical and practical dimensions.  We have, then, a 
standard of good practical reasoning: good practical reasoning will lead us towards 
eudaimonia.  Of course, this is much harder to evaluate than e practical syllogism but 
insofar as we can posit a definition of eudaimonia, we can evaluate practical reasoning.  
  An additional point regarding Aristotle’s theory was that the life pursuing 
eudaimonia is only available to relatively affluent males.  On the Stoic view, however, 
the good life was available to anyone regardless of station in society.  The Stoics 
contended that living well required that we live in accordance with Nature.  This allows 
us to be content with circumstances.  
 Though the middle ages, conceptions of reasoning, including practical reasoning, 
were generally expositions or modifications of the Stoic, Platonic or Aristotelian 
                                                
3 He presents the example to follow in Nichomachean Ethics, VII, 3.  
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positions.  It was with David Hume’s writings in the middle third of the eighteenth 
century that theories of practical reasoning took a decidedly different direction.  Indeed, a 
great deal of contemporary thought in practical reasoning and rationality can be traced 
back to the theoretical course that Hume began to plo . I will outline some of his theory 
below beginning with his broader theory of reasoning. 
David Hume 
 Hume made a distinction between two kinds of reasoning:  The relating of ideas 
and the relating of matters-of-fact.  The first type has since been termed demonstrative 
reasoning while the second has been called probable reasoning.  Demonstrative 
reasoning is concerned with the abstract relations of ideas, such as in mathematics: 
“There remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can 
carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect 
exactness of certainty” (Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.1, p. 51).  While important to 
these discipline, probable reasoning is far more pevasive in human life. 
 Hume’s probable reason is the associating of ideas based on their probable 
conjoining, determined inductively.4  As he puts it, “All kinds of reasoning consist in 
nothing but… a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or 
more objects bear to each other” (Ibid 1.3.2, p. 52)  The “relations” that he speaks of are 
of seven types: “resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity 
or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation” (Ibid 1.3.1, p. 50).  Of 
                                                
4 Hume articulates different types of probable reasoning: probability of cause, which relates to the idea of 
the cause-effect relation; probability of chance, in which the outcome of a scenario is not known, but there 
are a limited number of possibilities (as in gambling); analogy in which we draw inferences because of 
similarities between different events and outcomes; unphilosophical where other factors (like desire) affect 
the mind’s certainty of belief.  
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these, he holds that the only relation that is ‘discovered’ by associating ideas is that of 
causation, the others are observed in experience.   
For Hume, the discovery of causal relations always depends on experience and 
specifically on the repetitive observation of contiguity and succession between two states 
of affairs.  Reasoning of this sort requires a probable inference, which Hume says is not 
reasoning, but rather results in the presumptive beli f that the laws of nature continue 
uniformly.  Hume cannot call this transition from inference to the uniformity of nature 
‘reasoning’ because he requires some sort of foundation on which reasoning can operate.  
It simply exists as a sort of base-line cognitive function, from which probable reasoning 
can proceed.  Thus, Hume encounters a pervasive problem in philosophy: the problem of 
induction.  In this case, the problem is apparent in examining the epistemic justification 
for this type of inductive reasoning.   
 In terms of practical reasoning, Hume makes two significant departures from the 
Greeks.  First, he argues that reason has no motivati nal power.  Second, he argues that 
we cannot make moral conclusions from reasoning alone, which means that we cannot 
engage in reasoning which brings us to conclude which of our ends are ‘good’.  His 
perspective on these matters still garners a great deal of attention and I will briefly 
discuss each argument. 
 Hume’s classification of reason into relations of ideas (demonstrative) and matters 
of fact (probable) provides the major premise in his argument that all reasoning is 
motivationally inert.  Demonstrative reasoning involves abstract ideas (such as 
mathematics), and does not in any way connect to anage t’s volition.  Similarly, 
probable reasoning only results in the projection of a cause-effect relation, which does 
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not contain any inherently motivational constituents.  Hume acknowledges that 
motivation would seem to accompany reason, but he explains this feature as follows:  
…when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure fromany object, we 
feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity… this emotion 
rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends 
whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of 
cause and effect.  Here then reasoning takes place to discover this 
relation… But ‘tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from 
reason, but is only directed by it. ‘Tis from the prospect of pain or 
pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And 
these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that 
object, as they are pointed out by reason and experience. (Treatise 2.3.3 
p. 266.  Italics added).    
 So the ‘illusion’ (as Hume would see it) that we ar motivated by reason, is born 
out of the way in which we attribute (through reason and experience) the effect of a 
particular stimulus to produce emotions of aversion or propensity.  From here it follows 
that reason cannot ppose volition, for this would require a contrary motivation 
(produced by reason).  He famously concludes, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave 
of the passions…” (Ibid, 2.3.3, p. 266).  
Hume makes a further point by adding that passions (i.e. desire and aversion), 
have no representational quality and therefore cannot be opposed to the truth-evaluable 
conclusions reached by reasoning.  This, of course, is directly contrary to the Platonic and 
Aristotelian conceptions of a divided soul, whereby our irrational desires can be contrary 
to the rational desires of reason.    
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Hume does allow for reason to guide passion in two ways: when passion is based 
on a false supposition, or when it has incorrect means to be satiated: 
“…a passion can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable, but when 
founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses m ans insufficient 
for the design’d end… The moment we perceive the falsehood of any 
supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our 
reason without any opposition… I may desire any fruit as of an 
excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my 
longing ceases”  
 In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume makes a further move away from the Greeks by 
arguing that we cannot reach conclusions regarding virtue and vice by reasoning.  Hence, 
reason alone is no help in our pursuit of the ‘good life’ insofar as the good life is the 
pursuit of virtue(s).  He draws this conclusion from his argument that morals have an 
effect on motivation and volition, so necessarily cannot be associated to reason:       
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, 
it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; a d that because 
reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never ha  any such 
influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. 
Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of 
morality. therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. (3.1.1). 
 Later, Hume’s view of practical reasoning was termd ‘instrumental’, because its 
only justified concern is with the means of attaining pre-existing ends.  Clearly this is a 
radical departure from the Greek view on which reason was both a motivating force 
within each of us, and an instrument with which we could investigate how to live a good 
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life.  In the next section, I discuss the work of Immanuel Kant, whose writings brought 
another shift in theories of practical reasoning.  
Immanuel Kant 
 Like Hume, Kant offered an account of means-end reasoning.  However, Kant’s 
account of practical reasoning is much more ambitious than Hume’s.  Kant disputed the 
view that we ought to pursue an ultimate ‘good’ (like happiness or Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia), because it cannot be, in principle, establi hed by reason or experience.  
Such ‘goods’ are ideals of the imagination only.  Moreover, on his view, there is no basis 
for claiming that practical (or ethical) reasoning s solely a matter of means-end 
reasoning.  However, he does give an account of means- nd reasoning in terms of his 
principle of hypothetical imperatives.  These principles do not oblige us towards a certain 
action, at most they can be considered “counsels of prudence”.    
 Kant’s more profound theory is found in his attempt to lay down fundamental 
principles of action that serve to guide our behaviour.  For him, practical reasoning is a 
matter of the application of (and adherence to) these principles.  This project permeated a 
great deal of his work but his position remained constant throughout (e.g. Groundwork of 
the Metaphysic of Morals, 1785; Critique of Practical Reason, 1788; and The 
Metaphysics of Morals, 1797).   
 To begin, consider the conception of reason that Kant is trying to vindicate in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.  Onora O’Neill puts it this way5: “throughout the Critique of 
Pure Reason reason is depicted as an ctive capacity that both generates and may resolve 
problems.  Reflexive structure is part of the key to understanding Kant’s conception of 
                                                
5 The terminology in the subsequent passage is O’Neill’s.  Though Kant’s theory does entail a ‘reflexive 
structure’, he never used the term. 
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vindicating reason” (1992, p.288).  Reason is proposed as generating constraints to both 
knowledge and action.  However, reason is certainly autonomous in that it does not 
submit to any “alien” authority.  Thus reasonable thought and action is that which is 
constrained by law-like precepts.   
If reason will not subject itself to the law it gives itself, it will have to 
bow under the yoke of the law which others impose on it, for without 
any law whatsoever, not even the greatest nonsense, can play its hand 
for very long. Orientation, 8:145   
 The notion of reason that, for Kant, retains tenability is certainly modest.  
However, it is from this place that he sets out the law-giving principles of reason.  He 
seeks a fundamental principle of reason that is fitfor universal use (O’Neill, 2004).  In 
terms of practical reasoning, this takes the form of Categorical Imperative (CI) 
 In its first formulation, Kant states: “Act only according to that maxim whereby 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (G. 4:421).  This 
formulation has been taken by subsequent commentators (e.g. O’Neill, 1989; Rawls, 
1989) to be the principle underpinning a decision procedure that involves the following 
steps: (1) articulate the reason for my action (a maxi ); (2) imagine this maxim as a law 
governing all rational agents such that they are legis ated to act as I would in these (or 
similar) circumstances; (3) is the maxim conceivable in a world governed by the law (is it 
free from incoherence and contradiction)6? (4) If yes, can I will to act on the maxim7. (5) 
If yes, the action is permissible.  Note that we are not bound to perform actions that are 
merely permissible.  The CI, in this formulation constrains our easons for action.  Of 
                                                
6 This is Kant’s contradiction in conception.  An example is the maxim “it is permissible to steal”, since 
stealing presupposes property, but if it were universalized then there could be no property. 
7 This is the contradiction in the will.  An that would fail this test would be the maxim that we should not 
develop our skills or help each other.  Failures here prescribe ‘imperfect duties’. 
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course, we are still psychologically free to act counter to the CI, but Kant’s position is 
that we cannot rationally defend our behaviour when w  do so.     
 Through to contemporary theory, the influence of Kant’s ambitious account of 
practical reasoning has had its greatest impact on debates in ethics and morality.  Hume’s 
influence, however, was decidedly different.  The notion that all practical reasoning is 
instrumental garnered favour with other empiricists because it allows for an observable 
evaluation of the effectiveness with which a person reasons: I have practically reasoned 
well insofar as I am able to attain my ends.  An observer need only know my ends and 
whether they have been satisfied in order to assess my (practical) reasoning.  On the other 
hand, Kant acknowledged that an individual’s adherence to the categorical imperative 
was inaccessible.  He states in Groundwork that two individuals may behave in the same 
manner, but with different motivations.  He evaluated practical reason at the level of 
intent, while those following Hume are able to evaluate at the level of action.  The spread 
of the Logical Positivist movement in the first half of the twentieth century meant that a 
Humean version of practical reasoning was much more att active to many theorists.   
 In the next chapter I will discuss a theory of practical reasoning that purports to 
take the Humean, instrumental conception as foundational.  On this account, practical 
reasoning is assessed quantitatively, by its success at fulfilling an agent’s goals.  It has 




3. Expected Utility as Practical Reasoning 
 One of the more recent theories of practical reasoning that has gained both the 
support of empirically-oriented philosophers and a great prominence in the literature of a 
variety of discipline is Expected Utility Theory (EU).  The theory has been attributed by 
some (e.g. Hampton, 1994) as the most popular theory of practical rationality since the 
mid-twentieth century.  In this chapter, I discuss the origins of this theory, its main 
features and some of the popular forms that it takes.  
The Development of Expected Utility 
 Philosophers are familiar with the term ‘utility’ as Jeremy Bentham and 
subsequent utilitarians have used it: generally equating it to pleasure or happiness.  The 
term has a slightly different meaning in EU theory, however, as it is defined 
mathematically in terms of an agent’s preferences.  Nevertheless, both the Benthamite 
notion of utility and that used in EU theory are relative to the agent.   
 Central to the mathematics of EU are the use of probabilities.  The work of a 
number of Early Modern thinkers is relevant to the developments in probability theory 
and subsequently on notions of normativity in practical reasoning and rationality.  
Hume’s ‘probable reasoning’, for example, was discus ed in the previous chapter.  
However, nearly a century before Hume, Antoine Arnauld (1662) made a significant 
contribution to what would become EU.  He agreed with the commonsense notion that 
when considering a course of action, we should consider the probability of the possible 
outcomes; but Arnauld argued that a second feature o ght to be weighed in our decisions 
as well: the probability of the gains or losses that would accompany these outcomes.    
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Given theses criteria for making a decision, the normative standard was equated 
with maximizing monetary gain.  However, Arnauld’s formalization allows for what 
became known as the St. Petersburg paradox8.  The St. Petersburg problems is similar to 
another that I will mention in Chapter 4 (the Pasadena Paradox), so it warrants a brief 
treatment here.  Consider a gamble that involves betting on coin flips such that a payoff is 
given that is 2n the number of tails flipped in a row (n) before a head appears.  For 
instance, four tails in a row would yield sixteen dollars.  Since there is a possibility of 
flipping an infinite number of tails in a row, the gambler is obliged, by Arnauld’s 
standard (maximizing monetary reward) to bet any stake.  Even though a long string of 
tails occurs very rarely, when it does the large payoff creates the rational obligation to 
place the high bet.  However, this ‘obligation’ runs counter to both commonsense and 
experience.   
 The problem led to Daniel Bernoulli’s modification (1738/1954) to move away 
from the monetary payoff of the gamble, to the utility that money has for the gambler.  
Five dollars, for instance, might have more value to the man who is hungry and homeless 
than to the well-fed real-estate tycoon.  Moreover, the five dollars might not even have 
the same value to the hungry man once he has eaten.  Ber oulli argued that we ought to 
maximize a logarithmic function of money, to reflect its diminishing utility as wealth 
increases.  Thus, the gambler in the St. Petersburg paradox example is only willing to pay 
a finite stake, since the fair price reflects the utility derived from monetary value. 
 With the logarithmic utility in place, the results seem more inline with 
commonsense.  Using Bernouilli’s formula, a millionaire should pay no more than $10.94 
                                                
8 The earliest document identifying this problem (and giving it its name) is a letter written by Nicolas 
Bernoulli, the cousin of Daniel Bernoulli, in 1713. 
 
 21 
to enter the gamble, someone with $1000 should only pay $5.94 and a person with $2 
should bet the entire $2.  However, there have beena number of criticisms of Bernoulli’s 
solution.  Using his formula a payoff of $1024 is only valued as having ten times greater 
utility than $2.  This result would seem to run counter to most people’s intuitions.  A 
further problem is that a modification can be made to the St. Petersburg problem that 
stipulates that the payoff is made in terms of utility, rather than money; so the payoff is 2n 
‘utilities’ instead of dollars (Weirich, 1984).  This modification retains the paradox.
 Notwithstanding the criticisms, Bernoulli’s solution is heralded as the first 
substantive mathematical statement of EU (e.g. Biccheiri, 1998 makes this claim).  The 
modern accounts of EU have become more refined.  One area of refinement has been 
attempts at articulating the normative standards of how an agent employs probabilities. 
These ‘laws’ of probability because are foundational to modern accounts of EU.  
However, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, the manner i  which probabilities are employed 
may present problems to EU construed whether descriptively or normatively.  
 The probabilistic account of practical reasoning ad rationality parallels the 
probabilistic account of epistemic rationality (Bayesianism).  Probabilistic consistency is 
a standard of action or of belief.  Simply put, probabilistic consistency is the adherence to 
the laws of probability as articulated in the Bayesian project. The argument in support of 
probabilistic consistency was developed most famously by Frank Ramsey (1931) and 
Bruno de Finetti (1937).  The following sketch of their argument shows how probability 
theory is tied to the EU standard of practical rationality: (p1) practical rationality requires 
that an agent performs the action that will produce the best result, leaving him better off 
in all circumstances; (p2) practical rationality requires that an agent perform the action 
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believed to best satisfy his desires; (p3) practical rationality requires that the agent’s 
estimation of the best action for desire-satisfaction maximizes expected utility; (p4) 
trying to maximize expected utility by using beliefs that violate the laws of probability 
will not leave the agent better off in all circumstances.  (C) Therefore, practical 
rationality requires that the agent’s beliefs do not vi late the laws of probability.  The 
Dutch Book Argument9 is heralded as an example of why our beliefs and subsequent 
actions must adhere to probabilistic consistency (thereby supporting p4). 
 Ramsey and de Finetti’s work was tremendously influential to two economists, 
John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, who authored what is now regarded as the 
classic statement on EU, Theories of Games ad Economic Behavior (1944/1947).  The 
work uses a series of axioms regarding an agent’s preferences to determine a utility value 
for given outcomes, which is represented by a mathematical function.  Their proof allows 
for the fact that we rarely make decision with certainty regarding the outcome10.  
However, they require that a probability be objectively assigned to each possible 
outcome. 
 Many of the criticisms of von Neumann and Morgenstrn’s work target the 
axioms of their theory. There have been several restatements of the axioms using 
equivalence proofs (for example, see Bicchieris, 1998).  However, whatever the 
particular articulation of their axioms, von Neumann and Morgenstern regard rational 
                                                
9 An example of a Dutch Book problem is as follows: The ‘law’ of  additivity states that an agent’s degrees 
of belief cannot sum to a number greater than 100.  I cannot, that is, believe with 55% certainty that it will 
rain and 55% certainty that it will not rain or I might enter a series of gambles that would leave me broke. 
10 However, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms requi  that utility values be ascribed by an agent to 
outcomes that are certain.  These are termed, riskless prizes. 
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behaviour as that which satisfies an agent’s preferences according to the axioms11.  This 
is maximizing expected utility.    
 A second class of problems with the von Neumann and Morgenstern result is born 
with its requirement that probabilities be objectively assigned.  In ‘real-life’ decision 
making, we are rarely privy to the probabilities of various outcomes.  Further, in any 
complex decision (one with numerous factors affecting a variety of outcomes) even 
observers would have a great deal of difficulty pinning down the probabilities to use.  
This difficulty is a problem with the access to requisite information for von Neumann and 
Morgenstern EU-reasoning.  The theory might be unattractive as a normative standard of 
rationality, because it is impossible to implement in all but a small range of 
circumstances.  Further, the lack of the necessary information makes it problematic to 
construe EU as a normative theory of practical reasoning.  Is it possible to hold an agent 
accountable for the manner in which he uses information that he does not have?  If I base 
an action on the outcome of having performed (corretly) all the relevant calculations 
stipulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern, but have used an incorrect probability 
(because I estimated), have I reasoned poorly?  In Chapter 5 I will revisit this issue as I 
present an alternative set of criteria on which practic l reasoning can be evaluated.  
One solution to this issue, for EU supporters, is to use agent-defined probabilities 
such that the normative standard is tied to the information that the agent has available.  
Because the agent has all the relevant information, EU might be used not only as a 
standard of practical rationality (or rational action) but of practical reasoning as well.    
                                                
11 For example, the  transitivity axiom can be stated as:  If X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, then 
X is preferred to Z is implied. 
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In 1954 Leonard Savage, offered a representation theorem that allowed for the use 
of subjective probabilities.  He used the terms states, consequences, and acts, in such a 
way that each act/state pair produces a unique consequence.  For Savage, the agent does 
not believe that he can causally affect a state, only that it brings about a unique outcome 
when coupled with an act.  For instance, my choice (a t) that tails will be flipped (state) 
does not affect the outcome (consequence). 
 Joyce (2004) summarizes Savage’s contribution on subjective probabilities as 
follows: “There must be at least one probability P defined on states and one utility u for 
consequences that represent the agent’s preferences in the sense that, for any acts A and 
B, she strictly (weakly) prefers A to B only if Expp,u(A) is greater than (as great as) 
Expp,u(B)” (p. 138).  The axioms which Savage lays out allow him to guarantee that there 
is a unique probability and utility, that are unique to an arbitrary choice and zero-point.  
The expectation of the probability, utility pair rep sents the agent’s preference.  So for 
Savage, it is the individual’s expectation of outcome (and utility) that is used in the 
theory, not the objectively assigned probabilities of von Neumann and Morgenstern.  This 
means that by Savage’s formulation, an individual’s (subjective) expectations are relative 
to him and not evaluable in terms of practical rationality.  Two individuals with the same 
preferences can rationally choose to perform different acts, if they have a different 
expectation regarding the consequence.  On von Neumann and Morgenstern’s account, 
however, at least one of them has made an irrational choice, since the expectations (i.e. 
probabilities) are objectively determined.  
One further point on Savage’s theory:  A significant xiom in the proof is called 
P4.  This allows Savage to ‘define’ beliefs in terms of preferences.  Again, I use Joyce’s 
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(2004) succinct formulation of the axiom for which X and Y are states and O is a 
consequence:   
If the agent prefers [O1 if X, O2, else] to [Oq if Y, O2, else] when O1 is 
more desirable than O2, then she will also prefer [O1’ if X, O 2’, else] to 
[O1’ if Y, O 2’, else] for any other outcomes such that O1’ is more 
desirable than O2’… [Therefore,] A practically rational agent believes 
X more strongly than she believes Y if and only if she strictly prefers 
[O1 if X, O2, else] to [Oq if Y, O2, else] for some (hence any, by P4) 
outcomes with O1 more desirable than O2 (p. 138). 
 This is reminiscent of the Bayesian project, mentioned above, to have the standard 
of theoretical rationality be informed by the standard of practical rationality.  This debate 
has earned a great deal of attention .  Of present concern, is Savage’s position regarding 
the normativity of his axioms.  He holds that if an individual violates his axioms, he will 
not maximize his expected utility.  This failure is an indication that the individual is not 
behaving rationally.  If his action is assessed as irr tional, and given that his action is 
based on information that is available to him (according to the axioms), then we can infer 
that either the agent is not using the information well (i.e. has a practical reasoning 
problem), or he has a problem with his willpower (i.e. akrasia).  
In the next chapter, I will examine several of the paradoxes allowed by the EU 
axioms.  I will also discuss its applicability as a theory of practical reasoning (rather than 
a predictive / normative theory of behaviour).   




4. Challenges to Expected Utility 
 In this chapter I argue that EU is inadequate as a theory of practical reason.  I will 
juxtapose EU against a rival theory, dominance reasoning, across four problems: the 
prisoner’s dilemma, Allais’s paradox, Newcomb’s problem and the Pasadena paradox.  In 
the first three instances dominance reasoning and EU offer conflicting solutions, while  in 
the Pasadena paradox only dominance reasoning offers a solution; EU cannot.  This 
result, at a minimum, shows that EU is incomplete as a theory of reasoning and 
rationality and that it is in need of a complement.  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma  
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) was famously developed by Merill Flood and 
Melvin Dresher while working at the RAND corporation in 1950 (Albert W. Tucker later 
added prisoners in his version).  The problem presents a serious challenge to 
consequentialist accounts of practical reasoning because, in its basic form, it yields sub-
optimal outcomes for individuals who make decisions rationally aiming at individual 
optimality.   
 To begin, consider Tucker’s illustration:  You and an accomplice are charged with 
a crime.  The prosecutor offers both of you the same deal, but the outcome that you will 
face depends both on your response and on that of your accomplice.  The outcomes are 
represented in the following matrix: 
         Other prisoner does not confess         Other prisoner does confess  
You don’t confess One year in prison  Ten years in prison 




There are several additional assumptions in the basic formulation of PD:  The 
only goal for each criminal is the least amount of jail-time (e.g. compassion, revenge, and 
morality are not relevant factors in either criminal’s decision).  Also, each criminal 
believes that the prosecutor will not renege on the deal and is aware that the same deal is 
being offered to the other. 
Now, consider the deductive argument derived from the dilemma (Campbell, 
1985, p. 5-6).   
(1) Either the other prisoner will confess or he will not. 
(2) If he will confess, then confessing is better for yu than not confessing. 
(3) If he will not, then confessing is better for you than not confessing. 
(4) Therefore: confessing is better than not confessing.12 
There is no problem with the truth of the premises, y t if both prisoners follow 
this reasoning, they will each end up with the second-worst outcome.  By reasoning in 
this way, the agent acts according to his preference for each possible outcome (i.e. 
cohort’s choice).  This type of argument has been called dominance reasoning; Nozick 
(1969) states the principle as follows:  
Dominance Principle: If there is a partition of states of the world such 
that relative to it, action A weakly dominates action B, then A should be 
performed rather than B.   
Action A weakly dominates action B for person P, if and only if, for each state of the 
world, P either prefers the consequence of A to the consequence of B or is indifferent 
                                                
12 The logical form of the argument is: 
(1) P or Q 
(2) If P, then R 
(3) If Q, then R 
(4) Therefore, R. 
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between the two consequences, and for some state of th world, P prefers the 
consequence of A to the consequence of B (p. 111). 
In the basic version of PD, employing an EU function as a decision procedure 
produces the same result and advises each prisoner to confess.  However, the structure of 
the PD can support countless scenarios in which the ‘jail-time’ outcomes are replaced.  
But it is not the utility values that are assigned to the various outcomes that are important 
but the ordinal preference ranking of the potential results.  For instance, if X’s 
preferences ranking is A-B-C-D, then Y’s is (symmetrically) D-C-B-A.  There have been 
a number of variations to the dilemma which maintain h s symmetry but modify other 
contextual assumptions.  Of these, scenarios in which t e prisoners’ decisions are not 
mutually independent provide cases for which different reasoning models generate 
different advice.  In these causally dependent scenarios one prisoner’s choice can have an 
effect on his partner’s decision and EU and dominance reasoning pull in different 
directions.      
 Consider a scenario in which you and your accomplice have agreed before the 
arrest to cooperate with each other and avoid confessing “no matter what!”.  You are 
aware that your partner is completely honourable, and will not deviate from the plan 
unless he has reason to do so.  After being caught, the prosecutor lays out the possible 
outcomes and, knowing that your partner will hear about your decision when the 
prosecutor leaves, you deliberate on what to do.  After a short time, you decide to employ 
dominance reasoning: because confessing to the crim provides the best outcome 
regardless of your accomplice’s choice, you confess to the crime.  The prosecutor then 
approaches your accomplice and informs him of your c nfession.  The broken trust 
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influences him to defect from the plan as well and he confesses.  You are each awarded 
9-year sentences.13 
 However, if during your deliberations you decide to use EU equations to guide 
your choice, a different outcome would be reached.  Consider the method that you would 
employ:  Because of your partner’s past reliability and trustworthiness in similar 
circumstances, you discern the probability that he will stick with the plan (avoid 
confessing) is 0.9.  You use the jail-times as utility-values and work out the following 
equations: 
EU(you do not confess) = (-1)(0.9) + (-10)(0.1) = -1.9 
EU(you confess) = (0)(0.1) + (-9)(0.9) = -8.1 
EU(he does not confess) = (-1)(0.9) + (-10)(0.1) = -1.9 
EU(he confesses) = (0)(0.1) + (-9)(0.9) = -8.1  
 Since –1.9 is greater than -8.1, EU advises that you do not confess.  Obviously, 
this is a different prescription than that obtained from dominance reasoning.  Intuitively, 
the EU strategy seems better because it leaves both parties with their second preference 
rather than their third.  However, the implicit dominance argument is not clearly unsound 
so the question is left open regarding which reasoning strategy we ought to use.  If an 
appeal is to be made to the intuitive attraction of one strategy or another, consider the 
following case in which EU and dominance reasoning again pull in different directions 
but no clear winner emerges in terms of intuitive appeal.  
                                                
13 Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1972) used the Israel – Egypt conflict to illustrate this point.  Israel was faced 
with either withdrawing or remaining in its occupied territories, which would result in either a peaceful 
response or an attack from the Egyptians.  The dominant strategy was to continue the occupation.  
However, Egypt’s response was not causally independent from Israel’s strategy, so dominance reasoning 




 Developed by physicist William Newcomb, and made famous by Robert Nozick 
(1969), Newcomb’s problem presents another instance for which dominance reasoning 
and EU prescribe different choices.  Like PD, the problem has been presented a number 
of different ways, and the underlying assumptions are regularly tinkered with.  The 
version to which I will be referring runs as follows: Suppose that there is a being with the 
ability to make predictions with considerable accura y.  He has predicted your choices 
with flawless accuracy in the past.  One day he presents you with two boxes, one which is 
transparent and (as you can see) contains $1000 (represented by B$).  You are told that 
the other, which is opaque, contains either $1,000,000 or nothing (hereafter B?).  You are 
asked to choose either both boxes or only B?. If the being has predicted that you will 
choose both boxes, he has put nothing in B?. However, if he has predicted that you will 
take only B?, then he has put the $1,000,000 inside. 
 The game requires that you intentionally choose the boxes.  Nozick notes that if 
the being predicts that you will consciously randomize your choice, then he has put 
nothing in B?.  The choice that is made differs whether you employ dominance reasoning 
or EU maximization. 
First, consider an outcome matrix that illustrates dominance reasoning. 
     Being predicts One Box   Being predicts both boxes 
 Choose one box  $1,000,000   0 
 Choose both boxes $1,000,000 + $1,000  0 + $1,000 
Clearly, choosing both boxes is preferred whichever state of affairs obtains (i.e. 
whether or not the money is in B?).  The opaque box already has one million dollars or it 
does not, the choice that you make is assumed to be causally independent from what is 
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inside.  There is no backward causality in this version of the problem so you might as 
well take both boxes and have an extra $1,000 instead of leaving it in the clear box.  In 
addition to seeming logically sound, there is some intuitive force to this line of reasoning.     
 On the other hand, in order to make your decision you could articulate the dollar 
amounts as utilities and assign a value for the probability that the being has made a 
correct prediction and perform the corresponding calcul tions: 
EU(choose one box) = (1,000,000)(1.0) + (0)(0) = 1,000 000 
EU(choose two boxes) = (1,000,000 + 1,000)(0) + (1,000)(1.0) = 1,000 
 Thus, choosing one box would be the appropriate choice by EU.  Further, there is 
an element of intuitive appeal to this line of reasoning as well.  Many people may feel 
that choosing one box improves their chance of receiving the big prize despite the fact 
that B? is already either empty or full.  While this assumption is not supported by the 
scenario (the reliability of the being is not influenced by the agent’s choice), it is difficult 
to criticize using the EU approach here.  How can we support dominance reasoning over 
EU if only the latter leads us to the million-dollar prize?  While the dominance reasoning 
process is attractive, so too is the r sult that is achieved by EU reasoning.   
In the next section I will discuss a case which seems to undermine EU theory, but 
is easily handled by dominance reasoning.  This particular case highlights a weakness in 
the EU independence axiom but it also indicates that EU cannot deal with the entire 
breadth of scenarios to which practical reasoning (generally construed) applies.  
Allais’s Paradox 
Developed by Maurice Allais (1953), the problem presents a challenge to one of 
the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms, known as the independence axiom.  The 
independence axiom states, roughly, that if an agent is i different between outcomes a 
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and b then he will be indifferent between two lotteries that are identical except Lottery 1 
has outcome a and Lottery 2 has outcome b (see Chapter 3).  Now consider the following 
example where the probability of each outcome is denoted in a pair: 
Gamble 1 – choose either Lottery A or Lottery B  
Lottery A  = (1.0, $1,000,000)  
Lottery B = (.89, $1,000,000) (.01, $0) (.10, $5,000,000).  
Gamble 2 – choose either Lottery C or Lottery D 
Lottery C =  (.89, $0) (.11, $1,000,000)  
Lottery D = (.9, $0) (.1, $5,000,000). 
 The majority of people would choose to enter Lottery A in the first gamble and 
Lottery D in the second gamble.  However, Allais demonstrated that these choices are 
made inconsistent by the independence axiom.  This becomes clear if the gambles are 
restated.  
 Take Gamble 1, by breaking down Lottery A, it can be expressed as two 
probabilities instead of one: (.89, $1,000,000) (.11, $1,000,000).  Hence, both Lottery A 
and B have a probability .89 of outcome $1,000,000.  By the independence axiom (which 
eliminates redundancies), the .89 outcome is irrelevant in determining preference and can 
be discarded.  We are left with a choice between Lottery A (.11, $1,000,000) and Lottery 
B (.01, $0) (.1, $5,000,000).   
 A similar re-framing can be carried out for Gamble 2.  First, express Lottery D as 
three possibilities: (.89, $0) (.01, $0) (.1, $5,000,000).  Then the .89 outcomes for C and 
D can be discarded because they are both $0.  So the choice is now expressed as: Lottery 
C  (.11, $1,000,000) or Lottery D (.01, $0) (.1, $5,000,000). 
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 Thus, in the new presentation Lottery A is identical to Lottery C: (.11, 
$1,0000,000); and Lottery B is identical to Lottery D (.01, $0) (.1, $5,000,000).  
Choosing A and D or B and C is, therefore, inconsistent.  However, intuitions ad 
experimental evidence suggest that people will choose A with D.  There are a number of 
experiments in which subjects are presented with various versions of this problem.  In 
one small prizes were considered (Weber, 2008).  In another, subjects were presented the 
outcomes in terms of the chance that they would make a healthy recovery following 
surgery (Oliver, 2003).  It seems that whatever manipulations are made, people still 
prefer to make ‘inconsistent’ choices, yet these choices seem rational.   
Unlike the second formulation of the PD, EU pulls away from our intuitions here.  
An argument from intuition in support of EU cannot, therefore, be sustained across the 
board.14  On the other hand, dominance reasoning conforms to our intuitions in this case.  
Because it is not bound by the independence axiom, d inance reasoning holds that we 
select our preferred option for each ‘state of the world’, in this case each gamble.  There 
is nothing inconsistent, by dominance reasoning, in selecting both Lottery A with Lottery 
D.  In fact, if we prefer these lotteries, dominance reasoning prescribes these choices.  
Moreover, it does not appear that anything pejorative can be said about using this method 
of reasoning unless one has already made an alternative theoretical commitment, such as 
taking EU to be normative.  Of course, there must be grounds for doing so but even if 
such grounds are admitted, a scenario in which it fails completely to advise our choices 
would weaken its normative pull.    
                                                
14 There have been attempts to salvage EU from the independence axiom.  For instance, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1990) proposed prospect theory, which allows for a two-stage decision procedure to aid in 
alleviating ‘framing effects’.  While this may answer Allias’ problem, it does not salvage EU from theother 
concerns that I raise. 
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The Pasadena Paradox 
 Perhaps the most recent challenge to EU was put forward by Nover and Hajek 
(2004) who called it the Pasadena paradox.  Their problem shares some similarities with 
the St. Petersburg paradox (see Chapter 3) but has quite different implications.  Nover 
and Hajek illustrate a scenario in which a potential pl yer is left unable to decide (by EU) 
whether or not he should enter a particular lottery.  This is despite the lottery’s well-
defined probabilities and prizes for each of the rel vant outcomes.  
 The Pasadena paradox, like the St. Petersburg offers game players an opportunity 
to flip a coin in which the number of heads flipped in a row will determine the reward.  
However, the payoff structure has been modified for the Pasadena game.  If the payoffs 
have been written on cards identifying the conditional outcomes, they would read as 
follows: 
(Top card) If the first head is on toss #1, we pay you $2. 
(2nd top card) If the first head is on toss #2, you payus $2. 
(3rd top card)  If the first head is on toss #4, you pay us $4. 
(4th top card) If the first head is on toss #6, you payus $64/6 
(5th top card)  If the first head is on toss #8, you pay us $32. 
(6th top card) If the first head is on toss #10, you pay us $1024/10 
(7th top card)  If the first head is on toss #3, we payyou $8/3. 
(8th top card) If the fist head is on toss #12, you payus $4096-12. 
   M   
  (Nover and Hajek, 2004, p. 238) 
 This payoff structure can thus be summarized as $(-1)n-1 2n/n where n is the 
number of tosses on which the first head appears and a negative sign indicates that the 
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player is obligated to pay.  Also, given the ordering of the cards (each positive-outcome 
card is followed by five negatives), EU can be calculated using the series:  
EU = 1 + (-1/2 – 1/4 - 1/6 – 1/8 – 1/10) + 1/3 + (- 1/12 – 1/14 – 1/16 – 
1/18 – 1/20) + 1/5 + (- 1/22 - …  
  Nover and Hajek show that an approximate utility calculation can be made for 
this harmonic series because it converges to ln 2 + 1/2 ln(1/5) ≈  - 0.11.  The EU is 
apparently negative.   
However, there is more to the story.  In their scenario a gust of wind blows the 
cards off the table and their order gets accidentally re-arranged and now appears as: 
(Top card) If the first head is on toss #1, we pay you $2.  
(2nd top card) If the first head is on toss #3, we pay you $8/3. 
(3rd top card) If the first head is on toss $5, we pay you $32/5. 
 M   
(21st top card) If the first head is on toss #41, we payyou $241/41. 
(22nd top card) If the first head is on toss #2, you payus $2. 
(23rd top card) If the first head is on toss #43, we payyou $243/25. 
 M   
 If the run of cards with positive payoffs between negative payoff cards 
continually increases (which is a possibility), our expected payoff from the game will be 
infinity15.  
 Obviously, the problem hinges on the arrangement of the cards but the order of 
the cards is not specified by the game.  Moreover, EU theory does not a pose a constraint 
that requires that the terms in a series be naturally ordered.  So Nover and Hajek use the 
                                                
15 They express the mathematical property as follows:  
EU(game) = (1) + (1/3 + 1/5 + … + 1/41 – ½ ) + (1/43 + … - ¼ ) + … 
Since each bracket contains will sum to at least 1 and since the pattern is perpetual, it can be expressed as 1 
+1 + 1 +1 … , so EU is infinite.  
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Riemann Rearrangement Theorem to prove that the expcted utilities can converge to any 
finite value, or to diverge to either positive or negative infinity16.  This means that the 
expected payoff for the Pasadena game can fall anywhere on the interval (-∞ , +∞ ).   
 The problem is that even if we are offered an entry fo  free, we have no way (by 
EU) to decide whether or not to enter the gamble.  Moreover, if we are offered the choice 
of entering the St. Petersburg game for free or the Pasadena game, we will be unable to 
make a decision if we use EU.  Similarly, we cannot choose to enter a game identical to 
the Pasadena game except $1 is added to each payoff(Nover and Hajek call this the 
Altadena game).  They point out that the situation is analogous to comparing 1/0 to 3/0.  
We might want to say that 3/0 is larger, since both fractions have the same denominator 
but such a comparison is unintelligible as both 1/0 and 3/0 are undefined.  In their words, 
EU ‘remains silent’ regarding any decision involving the Pasadena problem.  
 Mark Colyvan (2006), however, showed that dominance reasoning is not at all 
‘silent’ in gambles involving the Pasadena problem because it is not paralysed by 
undefined expectations.  For instance, the Altadena game has a preferable outcome for 
each possible state (i.e. card drawn), since it is one dollar more.  We can then, choose the 
Altadena game over the Pasadena game by using dominance reasoning.   
 Proponents of EU might try to counter that well-defin d expectations need to be 
possible for a choice to be legitimately called an instance of practical reasoning.  This 
                                                
16 The expected utility calculation involves a conditionally convergent series (one series is convergent but 
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1− −  = 1 + ½ + 1/3 + ¼ + … 
is divergent (Colyvan, 2006, p. 459). 
 
 37 
defence would disallow the Pasadena paradox as a genuine example since it employs 
ambiguous expectations (e.g. the order of the payoff cards is not defined).  However, this 
approach leaves EU supporters in want of an argument as to why making decisions in 
cases where expectations are ill-defined ought not o count as instances of practical 
reasoning nor be considered as either practically rtional or irrational.  Further, there is an 
intuitive element to the Pasadena game: we can recognize that a potential payoff of (-∞ ) 
is something that should be avoided by any means necessary yet EU cannot offer this 
advice.   On another note, it is difficult to argue that the choice between the Pasadena 
game and the Altadena game is outside of any sort of acknowledgment by rational 
criteria, especially since a decision on the matter can be made by using dominance 
reasoning, which is a logically sound procedure.    
Can there be Harmony? 
 One solution to the inadequacy of EU might be to ascribe dominance reasoning 
and EU complementary normative domains.  EU might be given normative status over 
any case for which well-defined expectations are avail ble, while dominance reasoning is 
given normative status when there is causal independence between action and 
consequence17 (as in the first formulation of PD).  However, an extra axiom would be 
required to govern such cases.   
 The problem is that critics will be left questioning the rationale for making such a 
distinction.  To give such a basis, another question must first be answered:  What is 
practical reasoning supposed to do?  It cannot be that the success or failure of practic l 
reasoning is only measured by its success or failure n desire satisfaction; the views 
                                                
17 Nozick himself stated, “The dominance principle is legitimately applicable to situations in which the 
states are probabilistically independent of the actions” (p. 119). 
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considered so far maintain that what we believe or expect will satisfy our desires is the 
accountable element in practical reasoning.  But the in erent rationale for supporting EU 
or dominance reasoning is not one of belief, but one which shows that one or the other 
leads to the best result.  There is a danger of circula ity here: I satisfied my desire because 
I have reasoned well.  I know that I have reasoned because my desire is satisfied.  What if 
an error in reasoning like ‘affirming the consequent’ allows us to satisfy our desire, 
should we count this as good practical reasoning? 
 In the next chapter, I will offer one last model of practical reasoning that 
articulates a normative role for belief.  In so doing, the account offered will provide both 
normative criteria and a model of practical reasoning wherein both EU and dominance 
reasoning can be properly understood as varieties of practical reason.    
 
 39 
5. The Practical Reasoning as a Practical Argument 
In this chapter, I wish to step away from EU and examine another way of 
conceptualizing practical reason: as a practical argument.  This formulation has (at least) 
two benefits: it captures a broader range of cases to which practical reasoning might 
apply than EU and it avoids the potential circularity in defending EU by its propensity to 
advise towards desired results.  I then want to show w the EU formulation fits with this 
notion of practical reason.  
Practical Reason as a Practical Argument 
 Since Aristotle’s practical syllogism (see Chapter 2), a popular method of 
formalizing practical reasoning is by drawing an analogy to a formal argument.  The 
character of this formalization has been varied.  Consider the following examples, 
beginning with a schema offered by Paul Churchland: 
I want φ. 
A-ing is a way for me to bring about φ under these circumstances.  
There is no other way to bring about φ now which is as preferable to 
me as, or more preferable to me than, A-ing φ. 
There is no sufficient reason for me not to bring about φ under these 
circumstances. 
Therefore, let me do A. (1970, p. 28). 
 A second type of schema incorporates the application of a rule in reasoning: 
I’m in circumstances C. 
If I’m in C, then I ought to do A. 
So, I ought to do A. 
Therefore, I shall A. (Castaneda, 1975, p. 15).  
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An alternative model, proposed by Donald Davidson, uses a ‘prima facie’ (pf) 
operator that acts on pairs of sentences (moral judgment, and ground).  The prima facie 
qualifications lead to the acceptance of the respective onclusions because the agent 
presupposes that the prima facie qualification is not overridden.    
Davidson adapts an example from Aquinas: 
Pf (x is better than y, x is a refraining from fornication and y is an act of 
fornication) 
a is a refraining from fornication and b is an act of fornication   
Therefore, pf (a is better than b) (Davidson, 1969 p. 38). 
Each of these schemata18 represents the argument as logically valid since the truth 
of the premises entails the respective conclusions.  Of course, mere validity is not enough 
to confirm that any or all of these schemata should be considered as models of practical 
reasoning.  There are countless valid arguments tha we would not say are instances or 
representations of practical reasoning.  To address thi  issue, however, we must come to 
terms with the key elements of practical reasoning.  I began this project in Chapter 2; 
now I would like to review some of the features that emerged in that chapter as well as 
add some additional considerations with the hope of highlighting the definitive elements 
of practical reasoning.  
The first point of historical agreement that we saw in Chapter 2 was that practical 
reasoning is some sort of mental act which underpins action.  For the Greeks, this act was 
                                                
18 It should be noted that there is another way to conceptualize practical reason.  This has been termed a 
functionalist view.  This perspective holds that practical reasoning is the process by which intentions are 
formed from beliefs and desires.  This view does not require that the agent consciously draws a practic l 
conclusion (i.e. leading to an intention) from a number of premises.  Examples of this perspective are 
offered by Gilbert Harman (1976) and Myles Brand (1984).  However, this view does not exclude any of 
the schemata mentioned above.  The functionalist per pective leaves the questions of if , when and how
such models are used by individuals in the domain of empirical study.  So even on the functionalist view, 
pursuing the analogy between practical reasoning and a practical argument is permitted insofar as it i(or 
might be) supported empirically. 
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clearly distinguished from carnal impulses.  For Hume, it involved the relating of ideas 
enabling us to achieve our ends.  For Kant, it is the (mental) application of rules in a 
given context to guide our action.  To summarize this first theoretical confluence: 
practical reason has a cognitive element.  
A second historical point of agreement is that practical reason incorporates some 
sort of motivational element.  The Greeks attributed desire to reason itself.  Later, 
Hume’s famous assertion that ‘reason is the slave of the passions’ implies that we employ 
reason to satisfy our desires.  Kant, on the other hand, conceived practical reasoning in 
terms of the categorical imperative as generating constraints over our motivations 
(reasons for action).  As conceived in the hypothetical imperative, however, practical 
reasoning is similar to Hume’s account.  Hypothetical mperatives act as ‘counsels of 
prudence’ to help us satisfy our desire in a given situation.  Either way, for Kant, 
practical reason is connected to motivation.  
The final commonality that emerges from the historical perspectives is that 
practical reason is intimately related to action.  This is the primary point of 
differentiation between practical and theoretical re son.  The nature of the relation 
between reasoning and action is controversial, to be sure, but it is certainly not 
controversial to say that qualifying reason as ‘practic l’ entails some crucial relation to 
action or the potential for action. 
To be considered a descriptive model of practical re soning, any theory should 
incorporate each of these three elements.  Robert Audi (1989) suggests a model that 
articulates each feature as a premise in the ‘practical argument’.  His representation is as 
follows:  
Major Premise – the motivational premise: I want φ 
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Minor Premise – the cognitive premise: My A-ing would contribute to 
realizing φ; 
Conclusion – the practical judgment: I should A. (Audi, 1989, p. 99). 
 Note that the motivational premise represents the agent’s end, while the cognitive 
premise is instrumental.  Also, the conclusion (practic l judgment) is not an overt 
behaviour or action but rather, it is a judgment regarding taking an action.  Audi’s 
account is reminiscent of Aristotle’s practical syllogism but it is only offered as an 
elementary model of practical reasoning.  That is, i represents the key features of 
practical reasoning as placeholders over which much more complex arguments can be 
instantiated.    
 However, for there to be any real value in formalizing practical reasoning as a 
practical argument, an adequate account needs to be mad  of the connection between the 
practical argument and what we do when we employ practical reasoning.  Audi’s solution 
is to suggest that the premises of a practical argument are tokened in practical reasoning.  
This does not require that the particular sentences of the practical argument be tokened 
(there are countless ways that a premise could be expressed in, for example, English).  
Further, he does not require that all of the premiss of a practical argument be 
consciously tokened.  This allows for arguments containing tacit premises to still be 
considered instances of practical reasoning (i.e. the argument is represented 
enthymematically)19.  Generally however, the conscious, linguistic tokening of a practical 
argument is (for Audi) an instance of practical reasoning.   
                                                
19 A tacit premise could have an u conscious mental corollary.  Perhaps an underlying belief or desire, that 
is un-tokened at the time the agent reasons.  For instance: “I hear the dinner bell”; “Therefore, dinner is 




Audi leaves open the question of whether or not mental events other than 
linguistic tokenings ought to count as practical resoning.  For my part, it seems overly 
prescriptive to limit practical reasoning to entities with a linguistic faculty.  There does 
not seem to be anything inconsistent between a process with the three features of 
practical reasoning mentioned above, and an inability to use language.  However, I am 
inclined to say that genuine instances of practical re soning are mental acts that, 
potentially, can be represented as practical arguments.  In other words, practical 
reasoning must have enough linguistic quality (syntax and semantics) such that a 
translation to a practical argument is at least possible.    
 In support of this claim, consider some conscious, mental acts without linguistic 
quality to see how they are missing one or more key el ments of practical reasoning.  
Experiments in classical conditioning show that we do not necessarily need to ‘think 
through’ a way to satisfy our motivation in order to carry out the rewarding behaviour.  In 
effect, the practical argument analogue is reduced to a motivational premise, which is 
followed by an action.  Cases of aversive conditioning are particularly poignant.  For 
instance, an alcoholic who desires to change his destructive behaviour may consent to 
take a mild toxin along with his gin and tonic (whic  causes him to become violently ill).   
The next time he encounters a gin and tonic, he feels a wave of nausea and refrains from 
drinking.  Granted, agreeing to ingest the toxin in the first place in order to facilitate his 
sobriety was likely the result of practical reasoning.  The nausea, however, is a nervous 
system response: it removes the immediate cognitive element from his ‘decision’ 
regarding the gin and tonic.  It is because there was no cognitive element that  the process 
whereby he abstained from drinking cannot be properly called practical reasoning. 
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We can find a similar absence of practical reasoning in cases of habit.  For 
instance, in the morning and half-asleep, I reach for the glasses on my bedside table.  On 
this occasion I do not have any desire (conscious or otherwise) to retrieve them, nor am I 
thinking about their location, or my bodily movements.  My body simply performs the 
action that it does every morning, with minimal cognitive effort.  Here, my behaviour is 
lacking both motivational and cognitive elements.    
A simple example will highlight my point:  If my nervous system reacts to a 
stimuli (e.g. hot stove), by motivating a response (remove hand), then there need not be a 
cognitive premise20.  But without a corresponding cognition, there is no way that we can 
call the process reasoning.  Moreover, without a cognitive mediator, the process is not 
necessarily intelligible linguistically.  On the other hand, for mental acts that are 
legitimate instances of practical reasoning, the cognitive component allows, in principle, 
for the process to be accurately represented linguistically.     
 Thus far, I have been defending the practical argument’s descriptive validity.  
There are, of course, normative implications as well and I address those in the next 
section.  
Normativity for Practical Reasoning   
 Given the analogy to the practical argument, Audi (2004) showed that there are 
three dimensions on which practical reasoning can be evaluated.  A logical assessment 
can be made in terms of the relations between the premises and conclusions.  If the 
argument is deductive, then this dimension is relatively straightforward to evaluate.  It 
                                                
20 It is important to note that the same act could have incorporated a cognitive element.  For instance:  
“‘Ouch!’ / ‘my hand is on the stove’ / therefore, ‘remove hand’” represents both the motivational and 
cognitive elements. 
The cognitive involvement here is different from the reaction of what occurs in a simple nervous system 
reaction, even though the respective action may appe r to be exactly the same. 
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becomes more complicated when the argument is inductive, such as in arguments with 
probabilistic cognitive (instrumental) premises21.  Inductive arguments can, in principle, 
be evaluated according to their conformity to the standards of inductive logic.  For 
instance, degrees of support and strength (criterion of adequacy) for holding a conclusion 
based on the premises are subject to evaluation. 
 The second dimension of assessing practical reasoning is inferential.  The 
concern, on this point, is that the practical conclusion is actually derived from (and 
justified by) the premises.  An individual can make a practical judgment J without 
tokening a practical argument that concludes with J.  His reason for making J could come 
from any number of motivational sources, such as a habitual response or a desire for J 
itself22.  The inferential criterion prohibits an agent from rationalizing his practical 
judgment (or action) by coming up with reasons thatare unrelated to the process by 
which he actually arrived at it.  When my friend asks me why I went swimming, I can 
report that I felt hot, and swimming always cools me down.  There is nothing wrong, 
logically, with the underlying argument23.  However, my actual motivation was that 
swimming allowed me a reprieve from my annoyingly ever-present, non-swimming 
friend.  Rationalization is a matter of espousing practical arguments that have not really 
entailed the conclusion (i.e. the practical judgment), though they may appear to do so.  
It is for this purpose that the inferential standard is in place: its use avoids the 
possibility of rationalized practical arguments being confounded with practical arguments 
that actually have resulted in reasoned judgments regarding actions.  Note that there is 
                                                
21 An argument of this type could be: I want a drink; the fridge has contained drinks before; therefore, l ok 
in the fridge.   
22 I could, for instance, have a desire to open fridge oors.   
23 I desire to be cool / swimming will provide cool / therefore, go swimming.  
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also a temporal directionality to this criterion: the conclusion both follows and follows 
from the premises.  A practical argument is not an instance of good practical reasoning if 
it is constructed after the process that has led to the practical judgment.  In short, practical 
reason does not allow us to act first and reason later.    
 The third dimension of assessment that Audi advocates is epistemic.  This means 
that practical reasoning can be evaluated in terms of the agent’s justification for believing 
the premises in the practical argument.  Further, t justification for belief in the premises 
must be transferred to the conclusion in the appropriate way24.  For instance, we are 
epistemically criticisable if we have a stronger belief (or confidence) in the conclusion ‘A 
& B’, than we do in the sum of the premises ‘A’ and ‘B’.   
The epistemic dimension is not necessarily concerned with the truth or falsity of 
the premises.  An agent can be justified in believing a false premise and may transmit this 
belief to a practical conclusion without being reproached on epistemic grounds.  I may 
have very good reasons for believing that Europe is south of Africa: I might have seen 
this represented in atlases, been taught this fact by geography teachers whom I had 
grounds to consider reputable, and have heard a variety of people who had travelled to 
Europe tell me about how they flew “up to Africa”.  So were I to find myself in a place 
that I take to be Africa, and needing to orient myself toward the south, I could simply ask 
someone to point in the direction of Europe.  My error here would not be a result of bad 
practical reasoning, since I would have used the information available to me correctly and 
would I have solid grounds for believing the information accurate.        
                                                
24 Granted, there is overlap between the inferential and epistemic dimensions of assessment, since the 
justification of a premise or conclusion may be an inferential connection. 
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 Central to this dimension, then, is the notion of justification.  Of course, this is an 
area of philosophical debate in itself.   Admittedly, discoveries in the field will influence 
the grounds by which the epistemic dimension of practic l reason is evaluated.  This 
ongoing debate, however, does not detract from the need to hold practical reasoning 
agents accountable epistemically.  Consider the following example: waking up one 
morning I form (spontaneously) the belief that ‘milk is found by looking in the 
cupboard’.  The belief runs counter to the evidence that I have procured throughout my 
life: on each previous morning I found milk by looking in the fridge, I have seen many 
people retrieve milk from their respective refrigerators, watched countless milk 
commercials, seen where milk is stored at various grocery stores etc. Yet I still retain the 
belief that milk will be found by looking in the fridge and I am either unaware of, or 
simply do not care about, any apparent inconsistencies between my existing beliefs and 
the new belief that milk is found by looking in the cupboard.  I employ the following bit 
of reasoning (represented using Audi’s schema):   
Major Premise – the motivational premise: I want milk 
Minor Premise – the cognitive premise: Milk is found by looking in the 
cupboard 
Conclusion – the practical judgment: Therefore, I should look in the 
cupboard 
There is nothing wrong with the logical form of the argument, nor is there a 
violation of the inferential criterion (given that this particular practical argument resulted 
in the judgment that I ought to look in the cupboard to find milk).  The error here then, is 
in my belief that ‘milk is found by looking in the cupboard’.  I cannot provide any solid 
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justification  for the belief25 because it was formed spontaneously rather than as the result 
of some conscious process (like reasoning) or sensory event.  Further, the belief runs 
counter to at least one of my existing beliefs, that ‘milk is found by looking in the fridge’.  
The mere fact that the belief was formed spontaneously does not necessarily translate to 
an epistemic error if and when it is included in a piece of practical reasoning.  The 
epistemic criterion does not require us to introspect on belief-formation as a necessary 
component of good practical reasoning.  However, it is problematic when an unwarranted 
belief displaces one with a stronger degree of justifica ion or we go about reasoning 
without mediating between relevant inconsistencies.  
 If a practical argument contains irrelevant or superfluous premises, then this is an 
inferential matter.  However, if an irrelevant premise is enunciates an epistemically 
reproachable belief, then its inclusion in the practic l argument makes the reasoning 
epistemically criticisable.  For example: 
Major Premise – the motivational premise: I want milk 
Minor Premise – the cognitive premise: Milk is found by looking in the 
cupboard 
Irrelevant Premise – All dogs are cats 
Conclusion – the practical judgment: Therefore, I should look in the 
cupboard 
 The argument is epistemically criticisable (insofar as there is no grounds to 
believe that ‘all dogs are cats’), even though it generates a good judgment and there is 
nothing wrong with its logical structure.  However, it also violates the inferential criterion 
                                                
25 The only potential justification that might be offered is that I feel warranted in believing that ‘milk is 
found by looking the cupboard’ by virtue of the fact that I have the belief ‘milk is found by looking in the 
cupboard’.  However, should the basis for my belief b  questioned, I would not be able to provide any other 
reason for retaining the belief.  
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because  the conclusion is not connected to all of the premises.  On the other hand, the 
same argument that omits the premise “all dogs are c ts” is not at all reproachable, even 
though the same result is generated.   
The stipulation that the inferential criterion require that all of the premises be 
relevant was not specifically articulated by Audi, but it has two benefits.  First, it 
encourages a compactness and efficiency to the practical argument that would otherwise 
be absent.  This means that the inclusion of a superfl ous premise in a practical argument 
entails an inferior evaluation than would have been given had the premise been absent.  
Though this benefit may be merely aesthetic, the second reason to include the stipulation 
is more substantive: it disallows the explosion of superfluous premises in a practical 
argument.  Without the barring of irrelevant premises, a practical argument might include 
an infinite number of irrelevant premises.  Even if each superfluous premise is justifiedly 
believed, there needs to be a constraint preventing an endless chain of reasoning caused 
by the inclusion of an infinite number of irrelevant premises.  The inferential criterion 
provides a normative constraint preventing the explosion, but this is not an epistemic 
matter nor a logical one provided the reasoning agent has grounds for believing each 
premise, and the argument is logically valid. 
 One further point on the epistemic criterion is that the entire practical argument is 
subject to evaluation on this ground.  This means that in addition to whatever linguistic 
propositions are present, logical operators, conditionals, connectives, etc., are all 
epistemically evaluable.  If an agent believes pq, then his evaluation must address his 
warrant for believing the material conditional betwen p and q.  There is nothing, in 
principle, that impugns an agent for reasoning in accordance with an argument with the 
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form  p  (q  p), and ending with the practical judgment q.  However, he is 
epistemically accountable for his believing that ‘if p s true, then (if q is true, then p is 
true)’.  In other words, he needs to have warrant for believing the statement in its entirety, 
not solely the propositions p and/or q.  This highlights an important debate in 
philosophical logic: whether the classical validity of p  (q  p) is sufficient warrant to 
believe it for any case to which it is applicable or whether its warrant ought to require a 
contextual justification in terms of relevance for a premise of that form.  My aim, 
however, is not to resolve this debate here but to indicate that it will leave an impression 
on how the epistemic criterion is understood. 
By this practical argument model, it is the process by which we arrive at an action 
(or judgment regarding an action) that is open to evaluation, rather than the result of the 
process.  Moreover, the process can be represented li guistically as a practical argument 
with at least one motivational premise, at least one cognitive premise, and a practical 
conclusion.  The evaluation is made on the logical, nferential and epistemic dimensions.  
In the next two sections, I will revisit EU, then show how it fits into the practical 
argument model. 
EU and Epistemic Warrant  
 For the remainder of this chapter I want to consider whether or not an EU-driven 
theory is intelligible as a practical argument.  If so, then EU reasoning can be viewed as a 
species of practical reasoning, through it has already been shown inadequate to cover the 
range of cases that a wider model of practical reasoning is able to tackle (see Chapter 4, 
the Pasadena paradox).  
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 Recall that the practical argument contains three basic elements: the motivational 
premise, the cognitive premise and the conclusion.  Each of theses are addressed by the 
EU model as it attempts to quantify them.  The motivational component is captured by 
the value given to desire-satisfaction (in Savage’s formulation this was denoted by u(A, 
S)), while the value representing the probabilistic estimate of satisfying (given an act) the 
desire (Exppu(A)) captures the cognitive, instrumental component.  If he agent is trying to 
decide between a second course of action (B) and his desires (or preferences) adhere to 
the six axioms outlined in Chapter 3, then he can mke a decision based on the values he 
obtains (i.e. he will choose the larger of Exppu (A) and Exppu (B)). 
 I have shown in Chapter 4 that there is reason to be sceptical of the use of EU 
since it is inadequate to cover the entire range of cases for which practical reason seems 
to be applicable (e.g. deciding between the Pasadena and Altadena games).  The next 
point should serve to further delineate the boundaries for proper EU usage.  If I am right 
in supporting the three-dimensional normative assessm nt of practical reasoning, then 
using EU, in most circumstances, will fail the epistemic criterion.  In those limited cases 
in which EU can pass the epistemic criterion, its use may be warranted. 
 The epistemic weakness of EU occurs on at least two grounds. First, there is a 
wide body of research in cognitive psychology, which reveals that our predictions, 
estimations, and expectations are notoriously inaccurate26.  Granted, this appears to be a 
descriptive point, but as a practical reasoning agent if I am aware that I have a propensity 
to make mistakes when attempting to prognosticate probabilistic outcomes, then 
epistemically this information must be brought to bear.  In effect, I am epistemically 
                                                
26 Thomas Gilovich, Dale W Griffin and Daniel Kaneman (2002) Daniel Kahneman, for instance, combiled 
a survey of many of the relevant studies in psychology.  The studies show that humans have a propensity to 
commit specific errors in information processing.  
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accountable if I use information that I know is likely to be unreliable or inaccurate.  If I 
have a second, logically valid decision procedure which is suited to my context, and 
which does not require the unreliable information, then I ought to use it in order to avoid 
epistemic criticism.  This point is not unique to EU27, but to practical reasoning generally.  
I should be held accountable for knowingly using unreliable information whatever model 
of reasoning I am employing.  It would seem obvious to criticize someone who, while 
explaining his practical argument, indicated that he used a premise which he knew to be 
unreliable.   
 Granted, there are many cases in which we use information that we know to be 
unreliable because there is no other source available.  For example, police searching for 
an abducted child may follow every lead generated by people who call their ‘hotline’ 
even though they know that there is an overwhelming probability that the public 
assistance will not lead them to the child.  Using bad information in practical reasoning 
becomes reprehensible when there is an unproblematic alternative.  For example, should 
the police abandon their solid leads to follow a telephone tip given by a specific 
individual who calls with ‘information’ every time they solicit the public’s help 
(information that is consistently bad), they would be rightly subject to criticism. 
 The second problem, epistemically, for EU is that it generally requires more 
processing power than we are presumably capable of.  Any decision requires the use of 
mathematical functions like average, product and sum.  Generally, our working memory 
is only able to contain seven units of information, which is woefully insufficient for 
carrying out the calculations of a utility equation.  While it may be the case that practical 
                                                
27 However, it is particularly salient in EU.  Recall the von Neumann and Morgenstern formulation required 
the assignment of objective probabilities.  
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reasoning can involve the use of external implements (like a calculator or spreadsheet), it 
ought not to require the use of external tools.  Moreover, to attempt to make a decision 
by comparing EU values, while believing that a bad c lculation was likely made in 
arriving at those values, is epistemically reproachable for the same reason just mentioned 
(it makes use of information that is probably inaccurate).     
However, articulating these two limitations invites the question: What if an 
individual is able to reason by the EU model and pass the epistemic test?  In 
circumstances in which this is possible, I will argue that the use of EU is permissible.   
The issues of available information and processing power raise a capacity of the practical 
argument, when it is taken as normative: it can aid in the adjudication between competing 
decision strategies.  In the next section I will revisit the problems from Chapter 4, which 
provide salient examples of problems whereby different easoning strategies generate 
competing advice.  
Adjudicating Between Decision Strategies 
To show how the normative standards of the practical argument model can advise 
towards one or another decision strategy I will begin with a brief look back to the version 
of the PD in which causal dependence was assumed.  Using the practical argument 
model, the basic form of the PD can be construed as follows: 
 Motivational Premise – I desire the least amount of jail-time  
 Cognitive Premise – Choosing x will bring about the least amount of jail time 
 Practical Judgment – Therefore, I ought to choose x  
Recall that in a casual dependence scenario, the agent’s beliefs regarding his 
partner’s expected choices are relevant to the EU result but not to the dominance 
reasoning strategy.  In terms of the practical argument model, the diversion occurs at the 
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cognitive premise.  In the dominance reasoning the premise (and conclusion) can be 
articulated as:  
choosing to confess will lead to less jail time if my partner does not confess 
and choosing to confess will lead to less jail time if my partner does confess. 
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought to choose to confess. 
 On the other hand, the cognitive premise for EU reasoning might be: 
I believe each year in prison will cost me 1 utility. 
I am 90% certain that my partner will not confess if I do not confess.  
I am 90% certain that my partner will confess if I do confess. 
Therefore (given the sentences mention in Chapter 4), I calculate my 
expected utility as: 
Do not confess = (-1)(0.9) + (-10)(0.1) = -1.9 
Confess = (0)(0.1) + (-9)(0.9) = -8.1 
Conclusion:  Therefore, (since -1.9 > -8.1) I ought to confess 
 Note that practical argument model does not stipulate that the EU strategy is 
better than the dominance reasoning because it leads to a more attractive result.  In fact, 
choosing the EU strategy requires more questions be answered should the reasoning be 
criticized:  Why did I believe that 1 year in prison costs 1 utility? What support did I have 
for believing, with 90% certainty that your partner’s decision will follow yours?  Why 
did I believe that my calculations are correct?  
 However, the dominance strategy also raises an epistemic problem:  If I was 90% 
confident that my partner’s answer will mirror my own, then omitting this fact from my 
reasoning (i.e. it is not addressed in any way in the practical argument) commits an 
epistemically criticisable over-simplification of the dilemma.  On the other hand, if I 
include the belief ‘I am 90% certain that my partne’s answer will follow my own’, then 
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the dominant strategy is no longer to confess.  This is because confessing does not bring 
about the best result across each possible outcome.  Th  decision matrix would actually 
be construed as: 
Other prisoner does not confess         Other prisoner does confess  
You don’t confess 90% chance of one year in prison 10% chance of 10 years in prison 
You do confess 90% chance of nine years in 10% chance of no time in prison   
prison 
 Essentially the dominance strategy requires the prisoner to select one gamble over 
the other (confessing, or not confessing).  It does not advise on which is the better gamble  
(as EU does), but only requires him to select the gamble that he prefers.  This result 
highlights the importance of including relevant beliefs in whatever reasoning strategy an 
agent undertakes.  In fact this requirement is implied by the epistemic dimension of 
assessment28.  
  This highlights an important point: the practical argument does not, itself, 
adjudicate between so-called paradoxes of rationality, including those highlighted in 
Chapter 4.  Instead, it is by considering the criteria on which the practical argument is 
evaluated that can lead towards one decision strategy or another.  Knowing that reasoning 
is evaluated on logical, inferential, and epistemic grounds, an agent deciding on a 
decision procedure can ask three questions: (1) Do I have the information I need to use 
this strategy?  (2) Do I have warrant to believe this information?  (3) Will I be able to use 
the information correctly in the way the strategy requires?  As I discussed in the previous 
section, an agent who is aware of his propensity to make terribly inaccurate probabilistic 
judgments in terms of expected outcomes, or knows that he nearly always makes errors in 
arithmetic, would be justified in his reluctance to use an EU procedure.    
                                                
28 I should expect, for example, my reasoning to be criticized epistemically when I am looking for the milk, 
but do not instantiate my belief ‘I left the milk in the cupboard’ in my practical argument.  
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 The result of using the three dimensions of assessm nt for choosing which 
decision procedure is best for an agent in PD is paralleled in Newcomb’s problem.  
Notably, if the epistemic criterion is to be passed, the agent must admit relevant beliefs 
into his practical argument.  In Nozick’s version of the problem, the player is told that his 
choice does not affect whether or not the prize will appear when the opaque box is open.  
If the player does not form any further beliefs, then his choice to use EU or dominance 
reasoning as his decision procedure will depend on how he answers the three questions 
listed above.  If the questions do not direct him to one decision strategy over the other, 
then he is free to choose either.  Note that the outcome of the decision is not used as a 
measure of the ‘correct’ strategy.  
 However, as in the PD, a player who holds beliefs that are relevant to the problem 
(other than those stipulated in the Nozick version), is compelled by the epistemic 
standard to articulate them in his practical argument.  Examples of beliefs that could 
influence the outcome of the decision might include: ‘there must be some relationship 
with my choice and the final outcome that I don’t understand’, or ‘this might be a trick’.  
Of course, any ‘additional’ beliefs are also subject to epistemic evaluation.  It is not the 
outcome of the agent’s reasoning that provides the normative standard (i.e. did he get the 
$1,000,000) but it is the process at which he arrives at the decision.  In the same way, the 
decision strategy that an individual chooses to address a problem is not subject to 
evaluation based on the final outcome of that strategy, but rather on how well it fits the 
information available, the agent’s warrant for accepting (or rejecting) the information, 
and the agent’s computational facility. 
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 The three deliberative questions also apply to Allais’s paradox.  Recall that the 
problem hinges on the independence axiom.  An evaluation of an agent’s reasoning 
whereby he chooses an EU strategy would ask why he beli ves in the independence 
axiom, since it is the retention of the axiom that constrains the agent’s choices to the 
counter-intuitive lottery in Gamble 229. That is, it is only by this axiom that the agent 
must assent to the inconsistency of choosing what appe r to be the most attractive 
lotteries in each gamble.  Since the independence axiom was thus present in his practical 
reasoning, it is subject to epistemic evaluation.  The three deliberative questions might 
restrict the use of an EU strategy in the Allais scenario since giving an account of one’s 
justification for believing the independence axiom would presumably prove difficult.  
Especially since the independence constraint is not, itself, supported by mathematical or 
logical proof, but rather is laid down as an axiom in the EU proofs (for both von 
Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage).  
 Finally, the three questions evoked by the practicl argument’s normative 
dimensions apply to a player in the Pasadena game as w ll.  An agent would not be able 
to answer affirmatively to the question regarding the availability of information necessary 
to use an EU strategy.  The Pasadena problem was designed without well-defined 
expectations, which are required to employ an EU procedure.  Thus, an agent deciding on 
a decision strategy can easily eliminate the possibility of using EU.  
  Note that the three deliberative questions on information, warrant for belief, and 
processing power only serve to highlight, to the reasoning agent, the grounds on which 
                                                
29 Recall from Chapter 4, the independence axiom construe  Lottery A (100% chance of winning 
$1,000,000) as identical to Lottery C (89% chance of winning $0 and 11% chance of winning $1,000,000) 
and Lottery B (89% chance of winning 1,000,000 and 1% chance of winning $0 and 10% chance of 
winning $5,000,000) to Lottery D (90% Chance of winning $0, 10% chance of winning $5,000,000).  
Gamble 1 requires the choice between Lotteries A and B and Gamble 2 between Lotteries C and D. 
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his reasoning can be evaluated.  They do not prevent him from making an error in 
reasoning, nor do they necessarily prevent him from retaining an unwarranted belief.  In 
terms of selecting a reasoning strategy, these questions are helpful since they will 
dissuade the agent from using a strategy for which there is a lack of information or 
cognitive capability or for ignoring information that might be relevant to the outcome of 
the decision.  An agent who is aware of the standards gainst which his reasoning will be 
judged is better able to determine which decision procedure he will use.  This is 
especially relevant if the different procedures might pull in different directions as in the 
cases I have highlighted Chapter 4 and again here.  
I have argued in this chapter that the practical argument model has several 
benefits.  First, it provides a normative standard fo  practical reasoning that is not based 
on the behavioural outcome of the reasoning and, therefore, can avoid the circularity of 
measuring good reasoning by its outcome.  Second, it is able to encompass EU reasoning 
as well as other decision procedures (like dominance reasoning) that ought to count as 
genuine instances of practical reasoning.   Third, the practical argument’s evaluative 
criteria can help an agent decide which decision prcedure he ought to use, since they 









6.  Conclusion  
In this final chapter I highlight several of the key points that I have made.  I then 
conclude by offering support for the extension of the practical argument model into other 
disciplines. 
Recall, I began this discussion with the purpose of being clear on both the 
descriptive and normative questions of practical resoning and rationality.  I have shown 
how theories of practical reasoning have evolved from the Greeks onward.  As I noted, 
two problems are almost always encountered in descriptive accounts: akrasia (weakness 
of the will) and the nature of the relation between practical reasoning and action.  As I 
noted in the previous chapter, the practical argument odel handles these problems by 
articulating its conclusion as a judgment.  Whether one behaviourally follows through 
with the practical judgment or is swayed by competing motivations allows for the 
possibility of akrasia.  Further, I have shown that there are many behaviours that are not 
rooted in reasoning.  The relation between practical reasoning and action is symptomatic 
of a wider problem in philosophy of mind: identifying the relation between mental acts 
and behavioural acts.  I have left this question aside but answering it should not affect the 
validity of the practical argument model.  However the relation (or absence of relation) 
between mental acts and behavioural acts is put forward, the practical argument model 
only speaks to the ‘mental side’.  Thus, the project of being clear on the mental-physical 
relation can move forward without affecting the description of practical reasoning that I 
am advancing. 
  As for the normative question, I have shown how the popular modern conception 
of practical rationality, EU, has been undermined an why it is questionable as a 
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normative standard.  On the other hand, the practical argument model seems to serve the 
normative role well.  It has three dimensions of asses ment: logical, inferential and 
epistemic.  These dimensions capture the elements of practical reasoning that emerged 
from the various historical accounts that I considere .  Further, (unlike EU) this three-
dimensional assessment allows for a non-circular determination of rationality.  With this 
in mind, an EU decision procedure can be employed, but it is subject to each of these 
aspects of assessment and, thus, will not necessarily generate rational advice.  Also, an 
agent who is aware of the three dimensions of assessment can use them as a guide to 
which decision strategy is best suited to a particular problem.  The guide incorporates 
both the information available to the agent (his beliefs) and an understanding of how that 
information will be used (what computations are required).  I construed the guide in 
terms of three deliberative questions: (1) What information is available and relevant to 
this problem? (2) What is my justification for believ ng this information? (3) Am I able to 
use the information correctly (as required by the decision strategy I am considering)? 
To conclude, I discuss the potential for the extension of the practical argument 
model into other areas of research.  Any theoretical model ought to have some key 
features.  It should have construct validity: the model should actually refer to (and 
explain) the relevant concept.  In this case, the model of practical reasoning that is 
espoused ought to actually refer to practical reasoning and not be confounded with some 
other concept.  Also, for the model to have relevance i  an empirical discipline, it ought 
to generate some testable hypotheses.   
We have seen that EU easily generates testable hypotheses.  By acquiring an 
agent’s preference ranking and expectations, an observer can determine what he ought to 
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do.  However, as a theory of practical reasoning, the EU model fails to have construct 
validity.  Not only do we lack the cognitive and information-gathering capacities 
requisite for the effective implementation of EU in all but a limited number of cases, but 
the model does not extend to cases for which other models of practical reasoning can be 
applied.  Nor should EU be employed as a model of practical rationality.  The theory is 
unable to generate a rational standard, for instance, i  the Pasadena game, yet decisions 
regarding the game are still within the realm of practical rationality.  
The question left is whether or not the practical argument model possesses 
construct validity and can generate testable hypotheses.  I have used the historical 
perspectives, in part, to show that the practical argument model encompasses the 
common elements of practical reasoning.  The practic l argument contains these features, 
to which people seem to refer when they talk about practical reasoning.  Also, the 
practical argument model is able to cover cases for which EU remains silent (e.g. the 
Pasadena game).  This serves as evidence that the practical argument model has a more 
appropriate scope (than EU) in terms of practical re soning.     
As for testable hypotheses, the practical argument odel does not make any 
metaphysical claims that would disqualify it from epirical investigation.  To assert that 
there are such things as ‘linguistic mental events’ is generally uncontested in the 
psychological research community (though their terminology may vary).  The testability 
of the practical argument model may be possible through a well designed self-report 
metric. This should be relatively uncontroversial, even to EU supporters, since their EU 
theory could require subjects to indicate their preferences and beliefs (i.e. expectations) 
through similar measures.    
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In addition to research psychology, the neurosciences also could provide another 
level of explanation, though I do not intend ot offer this as more than an open-ended 
conjecture.  What areas of the brain are active when making a deliberative decision?  If 
the practical argument model is valid, then we might expect memory as well as 
motivational and linguistic areas to be involved when working through a practical 
argument.  How do these sections of the brain work together?  Is there an order to the 
neuron firings?  Other experiments might determine the depth of information-processing 
required to reason through a decision and whether or not we can perform concurrent 
mental tasks while reasoning.   
Finally, throughout the preceding chapters I have alluded to some of the debates 
in philosophy that will have an impact on how the practical argument model is refined.  
Discoveries in epistemology, for instance, could help to articulate the way in which the 
epistemic dimension is evaluated.  Also, the articulation of the relation between a mental 
act and a behavioural act might help the conceptual bridge between practical conclusion 
(judgment) and behaviour.  There may be other areas of philosophy which can comment 
on the practical argument model as well.  One question from ethics, for instance, is how 
do our moral beliefs interact with practical argument decision-making? 
 Having an understanding of how to make a good decision is vital to the Greek 
pursuit: living the good life.  The practical argument provides a model of deliberative, 
practical decision-making and offers criteria with w ich we can make an assessment of 
the process.  However, the onus is on each of us toreflect on our own beliefs, biases and 
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